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Abstract 
Fraudulent emails, otherwise known as phishing emails, use a range of influence 
techniques to persuade individuals to respond, such as promising a monetary reward 
or invoking a sense of urgency. The current study explored a number of factors that 
may impact the persuasiveness and trustworthiness of emails by examining 
participant judgements of 20 pre-designed emails that varied according to (a) whether 
they used loss or reward-based influence techniques, (b) whether they contained 
particular authentic design cues, (c) whether they referenced a salient current event 
(the Rio Olympics), and (d) whether participants had been previously exposed to 
information regarding online scams in general. Results suggest that the presence of 
authentic design cues and the type of influence technique used significantly impacted 
participant judgements. Findings are discussed in relation to theoretical models of 
phishing susceptibility. 
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1. Introduction 
Phishing emails are a growing menace across society, providing a quick and easy way 
to target large numbers of users with fraudulent messages. Within organisations, 
approximately one in ten employees have been found to click on links or open 
attachments during internal phishing tests (Verizon, 2016). The use of familiar logos 
and branding, accurate email layouts, and spoofing of email addresses to appear 
authentic, means that it is increasingly difficult to differentiate phishing emails from 
legitimate emails in the modern age. But what is it that makes people suspicious of 
emails that they receive? And what is it that persuades them to respond?  
Current knowledge and understanding regarding how people make decisions 
regarding the legitimacy and persuasiveness of emails that they receive remains 
limited. In particular, how phishing emails use particular content within a message to 
influence the susceptibility of recipients. Addressing this limitation is vital if the 
evolving problem of phishing scams is to be addressed. Investigating this issue is the 
primary aim of the current study. First, we provide an overview of previous literature 
related to how people evaluate emails that they receive, before outlining the aims and 
hypotheses of the current study. We then present our methodological approach and 
results. Finally, we consider our findings in relation to current theories of 
susceptibility to phishing emails. 
 1.1. Theoretical Background 
1.1.1. Role of Message-specific Factors 
Previous work examining the factors that impact susceptibility to phishing emails has 
ranged from sending participants pre-designed simulated phishing emails (e.g., 
Wright & Marett, 2010) to examining participant judgements of screenshots of such 
emails (e.g., Canfield, Fischhoff & Davis, 2016; Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, 
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McCormac, & Butavicius, 2012). The majority of these studies have focused on 
exploring the role of demographic or personality related factors, or the impact of 
increased knowledge and training interventions, on susceptibility, rather than the 
relative impact of various message-related factors per se.  
Within the integrated information processing model of phishing susceptibility, 
however, Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang and Rao (2011) consider the use of 
particular influence techniques on susceptibility to phishing. Influence techniques are 
techniques used within the email content to persuade people to respond. They include 
instilling a sense of urgency by invoking deadlines or time-limited offers, offering 
some form of reward, or suggesting that failure to respond to the email will incur a 
loss to the individual (Atkins & Huang, 2013; Cialdini, 2007; Stajano & Wilson, 
2011; Workman, 2008). Vishwanath et al. (2011) claimed that the presence of 
influence techniques within a phishing email monopolises people’s limited attentional 
resources, leading to other elements within the message, such as an incorrect sender 
address, being overlooked. This is considered to occur because influence techniques 
encourage more automatic forms of information processing that are reliant on the use 
of mental shortcuts (known as heuristics). As a result, more systematic consideration 
of the legitimacy of a potential message is not undertaken. The use of such heuristic 
processing strategies when evaluating information has been linked with a greater 
likelihood of considering information to be genuine (termed truth-bias; Harrison, 
Vishwanath & Rao, 2016; Levine, 2014; Toma & Hancock, 2012; Williams, Morgan 
& Joinson, 2017).  
 Whether particular influence techniques are more effective than others in 
encouraging these responses, however, is unclear. Although previous research has 
tentatively suggested that people are differentially susceptible to certain influence 
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techniques (e.g., Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson & McCormac, 2015; Oliveira, Rocha, 
Yang, Ellis, et al., 2017), current understanding in this area remains limited. For 
instance, phishing messages commonly either offer individuals a reward to encourage 
responses or suggest a loss will be incurred if there is a failure to respond (such as 
freezing access to an online account), but little examination of the relative impact of 
these particular techniques has been undertaken. Although Harrison, Svetieva and 
Vishwanath (2016) recently failed to show a difference in susceptibility to emails that 
contained threat versus reward-based cues, the psychological concept of loss aversion 
suggests that individuals are likely to be more sensitive to potential losses than gains 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). If this is the case, then emails that reference a potential 
loss may be more persuasive than those that focus on potential rewards. Although 
these influence techniques may not directly influence perceived trustworthiness of an 
email, however, the pressure to maintain consistency in responses and avoid cognitive 
dissonance in thoughts and beliefs (Festinger, 1962), may result in emails that are 
considered more persuasive also being rated as more trustworthy. Further work is 
required to examine this possibility. 
When making decisions regarding the legitimacy of online information more 
generally, a range of factors has been suggested to influence people’s judgements of 
the relative trustworthiness of a communication. Similar to the influence literature 
discussed above, these mainly occur as a result of people’s limited ability to process 
information. For example, individuals have been found to use relatively superficial 
cues related to the ‘look and feel’ of information when determining trustworthiness 
(Sillence, Briggs, Harris, & Fishwick, 2006; Fogg, Marshall, Ospiovich, Varma, et al., 
2000). Similarly, people are likely to only process the most noticeable (or salient) 
features within a message when evaluating a communication (Lang, 2000). Finally, 
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heuristics and biases related to the perceived credibility of a message source, and 
whether information violates expectations, also influence judgements (Metzger, 
Flanagin & Medders, 2010). Unfortunately, as phishing emails become more 
sophisticated in their design, they are increasingly able to mimic established and 
reputable brands and use expected email layouts in order to appear more credible. The 
extent to which people use these design aspects when determining the trustworthiness 
of email messages, however, remains uncertain. Furthermore, current understanding 
of how the presence of particular influence techniques within the message content 
may impact these judgements is also unclear. 
In addition to influence techniques and design elements, recent examples of 
phishing attacks have emerged whereby online scams reference well-known current 
events in an effort to appear more legitimate. For instance, following the high-profile 
data breach suffered by the TalkTalk Telecom Group in the UK, whereby hackers 
accessed sensitive customer information, a number of phishing scams emerged related 
to this event, with customers being targeted by scams that referenced the recent data 
breach. Similarly, scams linked to current sporting events and religious festivals have 
also been highlighted (BBC News, 2017). Linking phishing emails to events that 
individuals are likely to already be familiar with may further enhance the perceived 
credibility of the email, with previously encountered information likely to be more 
salient within memory and therefore more likely to be considered genuine due to this 
ease of accessibility (Begg, Anas & Farinacci, 1992). In this way, exposure to current 
events via media reports may make these events more salient, effectively priming 
recipients (see Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) for later phishing emails that reference 
these events. However, whether linking phishing emails to salient events influences 
people’s perceptions of the trustworthiness and persuasiveness of emails has not yet 
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been explored. Understanding how these various message-related factors (i.e., 
influence techniques, design cues, and referencing salient current events) impact 
perceptions of emails is the primary aim of the current study. 
1.1.2. Role of External Factors 
Previous considerations of phishing susceptibility have also suggested that people 
who are more aware of the potential risks of online environments may be less 
susceptible to such emails (Vishwanath, Harrison & Ng, 2016).  Although the use of 
educational and game-based interventions has previously been reported to increase 
people’s awareness of the risks of phishing emails (e.g., Arachchilage & Love, 2014; 
Kumaraguru, Rhee, Sheng, Hasan, et al., 2007; Sun & Chen, 2016), the impact of 
more general information in the wider environment on perceptions of phishing emails 
has not yet been examined. It is important that this is addressed, since members of the 
public are increasingly exposed to media stories within the local or national news 
regarding current online threats and the victims of online scams (e.g., BBC News, 
2016). Whether such media reports influence perceptions of email communications in 
any way, however, is currently unknown. A secondary aim of this paper, therefore, is 
to examine the impact of immediate prior exposure to general media reports regarding 
the risk of online scams on subsequent email judgements. 
Finally, people who have developed habitual responses to email 
communications (e.g., they engage with emails automatically and are thus less able to 
control their behaviour) have been suggested to be more susceptible to phishing 
attacks (Vishwanath, 2015). However, it is currently unknown whether habitual email 
behaviour also impacts how people evaluate email communications. For instance, are 
habitual email responders also more likely to assume that emails are trustworthy? The 
final aim of this paper is to address this question. 
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1.2. Hypotheses Development 
This study examines the impact of particular message-related factors (specifically, 
influence techniques, authentic design cues, and reference to salient current events) on 
individual judgements of the perceived trustworthiness and persuasiveness of emails. 
These message factors are predominantly based on aspects that have previously been 
considered likely to influence people’s susceptibility to phishing emails. However, the 
relationship between these aspects, and how they may differentially influence 
judgements of emails, is not currently clear. By systematically manipulating and 
assessing the relative contribution of these various message-related factors, it will be 
possible to address this current limitation.  
Hypothesis One: The concept of loss aversion suggests that people are more 
sensitive to losses than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). If loss-based techniques 
are more persuasive than reward-based ones, loss-based emails will be rated as more 
persuasive (H1a) than reward-based emails. Similarly, considering loss-based emails 
more persuasive may also result in greater ratings of trustworthiness (H1b) and a 
greater likelihood of choosing to respond to such emails (H1c).  
Hypothesis Two: Previous research related to judgements of online 
information suggests that design cues, such as the presence of a logo, influence the 
perceived legitimacy of information (e.g., Sillence et al., 2006). We propose that 
emails that contain particular design cues, such as the presence of a logo and a 
copyright statement, will be rated as more trustworthy (H2a) and more persuasive 
(H2b) than those that do not. These emails will also be rated as more likely to be 
responded to (H2c).  
Hypothesis Three: Previous research suggests that previously encountered 
information is more likely to be considered genuine (Begg et al., 1992). Phishing 
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emails have also been known to reference current events, however the impact of 
referencing salient event information on judgements of emails has yet to be examined. 
We propose that emails that reference a salient current event will be rated as more 
trustworthy (H3a) and more persuasive (H3b) than emails that do not. We also 
propose that participants will rate these emails as more likely to be responded to 
(H3c). 
In addition to these message-related factors, our study also investigates the 
extent to which email judgements may be influenced by prior exposure to media 
information regarding the risks of online scams. The impact of generic media stories 
has yet to be examined, despite media agencies increasingly reporting stories related 
to these risks. It is important, therefore, to consider the role that such information may 
have in influencing how people evaluate various types of emails. 
Hypothesis Four: We propose that participants who are exposed to media 
stories regarding the risks of online scams will rate emails as less trustworthy (H4) 
compared to participants who are not exposed to this information, due to temporarily 
increased levels of generalised suspicion. 
Previous research has also suggested that habitual online behaviour (i.e., 
automatically responding to emails received or clicking on links) increases 
susceptibility to phishing (Vishwanath, 2015). However, it is currently uncertain 
whether such automatic responses are also related to greater trust in email 
communications in general.  
Hypothesis Five: If habitual email behaviour is also related to an increased 
likelihood of considering information to be trustworthy, then a positive correlation 
will be found between self-reported habitual email use and ratings of trust (H5). 
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 Finally, within this study we also explore whether participant perceptions of 
their decision making strategies correspond with the factors listed above (i.e., the 
presence of influence techniques and design cues, and the role of routine behaviour). 
By addressing these research questions, we hope to contribute to the further 
development of theoretical models in this area. Specifically, we aim to further 
understanding in relation to the role of loss and reward-based influence techniques, 
design cues, and referencing salient current events, on evaluations of email 
trustworthiness and persuasiveness. This work also contributes to current 
understanding regarding the potential role of particular external factors on email 
judgements, particularly the extent to which generic awareness messages influence 
email judgements. By understanding what information does, and does not, impact 
perceptions of phishing emails, it will be possible to develop better awareness 
communications in the future.  
2. Method 
A 2x2x2x2 mixed design was used, with three within group factors and one between 
group factor. The within group factors included (a) whether the email included loss or 
reward-based influence techniques, (b) whether the email included specific authentic 
design cues (i.e., the email contained particular design cues vs. did not contain these 
cues), and (c) whether the email referenced a salient current event (i.e., the email 
referenced the Rio Olympics vs. made no reference to the Rio Olympics). The 
between group factor was whether participants were exposed to the online risks news 
story or to an unrelated news story prior to the email judgement task. Dependent 
variables included how trustworthy and persuasive the emails were considered to be 
and whether participants would respond to the email. 
2.1. Stimuli and Measures 
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2.1.1. Risk Information Manipulation 
A brief news story regarding the risk of online scams (total 80 words) and an 
unrelated news story that did not reference online scams (total 82 words) were 
created. The risk of online scams story represented our generic risk awareness 
manipulation. News stories were designed by the researchers and based on actual 
current news stories. Stories were matched according to layout, style and length and 
are shown in the Appendix. 
2.1.2. Salient Current Event 
A brief news story regarding the closing ceremony of the 2016 Rio Olympics (total 74 
words) was also created based on actual current news stories. This was to ensure that 
all participants were familiar with this particular current event, which was then used 
as the salient current event referenced within a subset of emails. This story is shown 
in the Appendix. 
2.1.3. Email Stimuli 
The email stimuli used within the study consisted of twenty pre-designed emails that 
varied according to the presence of particular cues. Although the researchers designed 
these emails, the content and layout was based on phishing emails received by the 
authors or found online. This is an approach previously used in phishing susceptibility 
research to identify email stimuli (e.g., Parsons, McCormac, Pattinson, Butavicius & 
Jerram, 2013). This approach enabled us to systematically manipulate the presence of 
particular cues within the emails and therefore investigate how these cues influence 
judgements of emails.  
Emails were designed to vary on the following dimensions: 
1. Influence technique: Emails varied according to whether they focused on 
reward-based or loss-based influence techniques. Reward-based emails 
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offered some form of reward for responding, such as a free gift or special offer 
(e.g., ‘Just click HERE to be in with a chance to win!’). Loss-based emails 
suggested that the recipient would lose access to something if they failed to 
respond, such as an account being frozen (e.g., ‘Your internet banking access 
has been temporarily suspended… Click HERE to reinstate your account’). 
Loss-based emails did not reference the Rio Olympics. 
2. Authentic design cues: Emails varied according to whether they contained 
authentic design cues or not. Those containing authentic design cues included 
a relevant logo, a purported copyright statement at the bottom of the email 
(e.g., ‘Copyright © 2016 [company name]. All Rights Reserved.’) and 
reference to the professed organisation within the purported sender email 
address (e.g., From: [company name] 
(do_not_reply@euro.companyname.com) rather than a generic email address 
(e.g., ‘freeiphone@gmail.com’). All email addresses were inaccurate, 
however, and should therefore have invoked a degree of suspicion in 
participants. Emails were identical in every other way.  
3. Salient current event reference: Emails varied according to whether they 
referenced a salient current event (specifically, the 2016 Rio Olympics) within 
the message content (e.g., ‘[company name] is actively supporting the Rio 
Olympics this summer. To celebrate this we are offering…’) and email subject 
heading (e.g., ‘Win free flights to celebrate Rio 2016!’) or did not reference 
any particular event. Emails that referenced Rio 2016 and those that did not 
were identical in all other aspects to enable matched comparison. The same 
professed organisations were also used within both sets of emails in order to 
prevent familiarity with a particular organisation confounding the results.  
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To enable us to examine the influence of these various factors without requiring 
participants to view too many emails, only four loss-based emails were included. 
These did not reference the Rio Olympics and were used as a comparator with the 
first four reward-based emails viewed by participants that did not reference the Rio 
Olympics. All emails were matched according to length, layout, and grammar / 
spelling, with emails only differing according to the particular aspects described 
above. All emails referenced well-known organisations that have been used in 
phishing attacks. In sum, this provided the following six conditions. The first four 
conditions all used reward-based influence techniques:  
1. Four high authentic design emails that referenced the Rio Olympics (Mean 
word count = 69.75; SD =2.87);  
2. Four high authentic design emails that did not reference the Rio Olympics 
(Mean word count = 69.00; SD =3.83);  
3. Four low authentic design emails that referenced the Rio Olympics (Mean 
word count = 62.25; SD =3.30);  
4. Four low authentic design emails that did not reference the Rio Olympics 
(Mean word count = 61.75; SD =3.40);  
5. Two high authentic design emails that used loss-based influence 
techniques (Mean word count = 60.00; SD =2.83); 
6.  Two low authentic design emails that used loss-based influence 
techniques (Mean word count = 53.00; SD =1.41). 
Example stimuli for each condition are shown in the Appendix. As we were interested 
in understanding what message factors make people more or less suspicious of 
various cues commonly contained within phishing emails, rather than their ability to 
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discriminate between phishing and legitimate emails per se, we did not include any 
legitimate emails for comparison. 
2.1.4. Questionnaire Measures 
The 12-item email habits questionnaire (Vishwanath et al., 2016) was used to provide 
a measure of habitual email use. This self-report questionnaire measure is an adapted 
version of the Self-Report Habit Index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003) and measures the 
extent that people engage in habitual, automatic behaviour in a particular context. In 
this case, whether individuals engage in habitual use of email. For example: ‘Email 
use is something I do without thinking’ (answered on a scale of 1-7).  
A number of additional questions were also included within the study. These 
included a rating of familiarity for each of the organisations referenced within the 
phishing emails (on a scale of 1-5; 1 = extremely familiar, 5 = not at all familiar) and 
three questions taken from Williams et al. (2017) related to general awareness of 
scams: ‘To what extent do you trust email communications in general?’ (1 = almost 
never, 7 = almost always); ‘How confident are you in your ability to differentiate 
genuine communications from scam communications in daily life?’ (1 = very 
uncertain, 7 = very confident); and ‘How would you rate your awareness of the 
common techniques used in scams?’ (1 = very unaware, 7 = very aware).  
2.2. Data Collection 
2.2.1. Participants 
Participants were recruited from Central Washington University to complete an online 
study exploring mass-marketing communications. One hundred and eighty-four 
participants completed the study in exchange for university course credit. Six 
participants were excluded due to a failure to complete the judgement task, resulting 
in a final sample size of 178. One hundred and twenty-four participants were female 
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and fifty-four were male. The majority of participants reported being in the 18-24 
years age group category (168 participants), the remaining 10 participants were over 
the age of 24. 
2.2.2. Procedure 
The University’s Ethical Review Board granted ethical approval for the study. The 
study was conducted online using the Qualtrics online survey platform 
(www.qualtrics.com). Informed consent was provided online prior to the main study, 
with participants provided with ethical information regarding study participation 
before being required to complete a check box in order to access the main survey. 
Following this, participants provided demographic information (e.g., age, gender, 
nationality, employment status and education level) before being randomly allocated 
to either the risk information group (90 participants) or the control group (88 
participants) by the survey software. Exposure to risk information: between-group 
manipulation: Prior to the email judgement task, those in the risk information group 
were exposed to the risk of online scams news story. Those in the control group 
viewed the unrelated news story.. To ensure that participants attended to the news 
stories, they were asked ‘What is the subject of this news story?’ following exposure 
to the story (open-ended question). All participants completed this question 
accurately.   
Exposure to salient current event: Following this, all participants were exposed to the 
2016 Rio Olympics news story. Once again, to ensure that participants attended to the 
news story, they were asked ‘What is the subject of this news story?’. All participants 
completed this question accurately.   
Email judgement task: Participants then viewed the series of 20 pre-designed emails. 
For each email, participants were required to indicate (a) whether they would be most 
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likely to respond to the email or ignore the email (Respond (R)/ Ignore (I); recorded 
as 1 for respond and 2 for ignore within the dataset), (b) how trustworthy they 
considered the email to be (on a scale of 1-5, where 1 = extremely trustworthy and 5 = 
not at all trustworthy) and (c) how persuasive they considered the email to be (on a 
scale of 1-5, where 1 = extremely persuasive and 5 = not at all persuasive). Following 
the email judgement task, participants completed the questionnaire measures. Finally, 
participants were asked what factors influenced their decision regarding whether to 
respond to an email.  This was an open-ended question that provided qualitative data 
for thematic analysis. Following this, participants were automatically directed to full 
debriefing information regarding the study. Data collection took place in Autumn 
2016.  
2.3. Data Analysis 
2.3.1. Quantitative Data: Email Judgements 
To examine the influence of message-related factors and risk information on email 
judgements, mixed ANOVAs were computed for each of the dependent variables 
(persuasiveness ratings, trust ratings, and response choice (the proportion of emails to 
which participants chose ‘respond’ for each condition)). Primary influence technique 
(reward vs. loss), authentic design cues (high vs. low) and reference to salient current 
events (reference Rio Olympics vs. no reference to Rio Olympics) were used as 
within group factors and group (risk information group vs. control group) was used as 
the between group factor.  
To examine whether habitual email use was related to email judgements, 
bivariate correlations were computed between scores on the adapted Self-Report 
Habit Index (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003; Vishwanath et al., 2016) and mean trust 
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ratings, persuasiveness ratings and response choice across the various email 
conditions. 
2.3.2. Qualitative Data: Participants Self-reported Reasons for their Decisions  
A single rater analysed participants’ self-reported reasons for their decisions 
according to the presence of particular theoretically-driven themes based on the study 
hypotheses and previous research regarding susceptibility to phishing (Stajano, & 
Wilson, 2011; Vishwanath et al., 2011; 2016; Williams et al., 2017). These themes 
included: 
(a) The role of influence techniques - reference to the presence of particular 
influence techniques included within emails as influencing their decision, such 
as known and trusted organisations (authority influence technique), the 
requirement to undertake an urgent or important action quickly (urgency 
influence technique), the provision of incentives and rewards (reward-based 
influence technique), the threat of loss (loss-based influence technique), or 
referencing a salient current event. 
(b) The presence of authentic design cues - reference to particular authentic 
design cues present within the email, such as the use of a logo, the use of 
copyright statements, and email addresses that appear legitimate. 
(c) Individual habits and routine behaviour - reference to behavioural habits, 
such as always ignoring or responding to particular types of emails. 
3. Results  
First, we present the findings related to the message-specific factors (H1-H3) before 
presenting results related to the between group factor of exposure to information 
regarding online risks (H4). We then present the results related to the email habits 
questionnaire (H5) and results of the qualitative data analysis. Table 1 provides 
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summary statistics according to each condition and Table 2 summarises results in 
relation to study hypotheses. 
  
 Table 1. Summary statistics of ratings of email trust, persuasiveness and response likelihood according to group and condition. 
  Risk Information Group Control Group 
  Trust ratings Persuasiveness 
ratings 
Response 
likelihood  
Trust ratings Persuasiveness 
ratings 
Response 
likelihood 
High Authentic 
Design Cue 
Reward: Reference 
Rio Olympics 
3.61(1.00) 3.51(.93) 23% 3.38(1.08) 3.37(1.00) 33% 
Reward: Does not 
reference Rio 
Olympics 
3.55(.81) 3.51(.82) 28% 3.49(.84) 3.45(.76) 33% 
Loss 3.23(1.08) 3.08(1.05) 47% 3.16(.97) 3.02(.99) 57% 
Low Authentic 
Design Cue 
Reward: References 
Rio Olympics 
4.58(.54) 4.37(.68) 4% 4.47(.63) 4.23(.71) 8% 
Reward: Does not 
reference Rio 
Olympics 
4.49(.62) 4.27(.71) 7% 4.38(.64) 4.23(.69) 9% 
Loss 4.40(.84) 4.08(.95) 19% 4.33(.90) 3.93(1.11) 24% 
Note: Due to the likert scale anchors used, lower trust and persuasiveness ratings = increased trust and persuasiveness. 
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Table 2. Summary of findings in relation to study hypotheses. 
H1a: Loss-based emails will be rated as more persuasive than reward-based emails. Supported 
H1b: Loss-based emails will be rated as more trustworthy than reward-based emails. Supported 
H1c: Loss-based emails will be more likely to be rated respond than reward-based emails. Supported 
H2a: Emails that contain particular design cues, such as the presence of a logo and copyright statement, will be rated as 
more trustworthy than those that do not.  
Supported 
H2b: Emails that contain particular design cues, such as the presence of a logo and copyright statement, will be rated as 
more persuasive than those that do not. 
Supported 
H2c: Emails that contain particular design cues, such as the presence of a logo and copyright statement, will be more 
likely to be rated respond than those that do not. 
Supported 
H3a: Emails that reference a salient current event will be rated as more trustworthy than emails that do not. Not supported 
H3b: Emails that reference a salient current event will be rated as more persuasive than emails that do not. Not supported 
H3c: Emails that reference a salient current event will be more likely to be rated respond than emails that do not. Not supported 
H4: Participants who are exposed to generic information regarding online risks will rate emails as less trustworthy 
compared to participants not exposed to this information. 
Not supported 
H5: Self-reported habitual email use will be related to an increased likelihood of considering emails to be trustworthy. Not supported 
DRAFT 
 
 
3.1. H1: The Impact of Loss and Reward-based Influence Techniques on Email 
Judgements 
H1a: In relation to email persuasiveness, a main effect of influence technique 
was found, F(1, 176) = 31.46, p = .001, η2 = .05 such that emails using loss-based 
influence techniques were considered to be more persuasive than those using reward-
based techniques (loss-based emails: M = 3.53, SE = .063, CI = 3.40, 3.65; reward-
based emails: M = 3.87, SE = .047, CI = 3.78, 3.96), supporting hypothesis 1a. An 
interaction between influence technique and authentic design cues was also found, 
F(1, 176) = 5.154, p = .024, η2 = .003, such that the difference between loss- and 
reward-based emails was larger in the high authentic design cue condition compared 
to the low authentic design cue condition. 
H1b: A main effect of influence technique was also found for ratings of email 
trustworthiness, F(1, 176) = 11.49, p = .001, η2 = .009, such that emails using loss-
based influence techniques were considered to be more trustworthy than those using 
reward-based techniques (loss-based emails: M = 3.78, SE = .058, CI = 3.67, 3.90; 
reward-based emails: M = 3.98, SE = .043, CI = 3.89, 4.06), supporting hypothesis 
1b. Similarly to the results for email persuasiveness, an interaction was also found 
between influence technique and authentic design cues, F(1, 176) = 12.873, p < .001, 
η2 = .047, such that the difference between loss- and reward-based emails was larger 
in the high authentic design cue condition compared to the low authentic design cue 
condition.  
H1c: Finally, a main effect of influence technique was also found in relation 
to response choice, F(1, 176) = 41.56, p < .001, η2 = .108, such that emails using 
loss-based influence techniques were more likely to be responded to than those using 
reward-based techniques (loss-based emails: M = 1.63 (63% of loss-based emails 
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rated ‘ignore’, 37% of loss-based emails rated ‘respond’), SE = .025, CI = 1.58, 1.68; 
reward-based emails: M = 1.83 (83% of reward-based emails rated ‘ignore’, 17% of 
reward-based emails rated ‘respond’), SE = .17, CI = 1.79, 1.86), supporting 
hypothesis 1c. An interaction between influence technique and authentic design cues 
was found, F(1, 176) = 17.18, p < .001, η2 = .026, such that the difference between 
loss- and reward-based emails was larger in the high authentic design cues condition 
compared to the low authentic design cues condition.  
3.2. H2: The Impact of Authentic Design Cues on Email Judgements 
H2a: A significant main effect of authentic design cues was found for ratings 
of email trustworthiness, F(1, 176) = 197.80, p < .001, η2 = .307, with emails in the 
high authentic design cue (HA) condition rated as more trustworthy than emails in the 
low authentic design cue (LA) condition (HA: M = 3.51, SE = .066, CI = 3.38, 3.64; 
LA: M = 4.48, SE = .041, CI = 4.40, 4.56), supporting hypothesis 2a, that emails 
containing authentic design cues would be rated as more trustworthy than emails that 
did not.  
H2b: Similar to ratings of trust, a significant main effect of authentic design 
cues was also found for email persuasiveness, F(1, 176) = 182.30, p < .001, η2 = 
.406, with emails in the high authentic design cue (HA) condition rated as more 
persuasive than emails in the low authentic design cue (LA) condition (HA: M = 3.46, 
SE = .062, CI = 3.34, 3.59; LA: M = 4.28, SE = .049, CI = 4.18, 4.37), supporting 
hypothesis 2b. 
H2c: Finally, a significant main effect of authentic design cues was found for 
response choice, F(1, 176) = 92.62, p < .001, η2 = .173, with emails in the high 
authentic design cues (HA) condition more likely to be responded to than emails in 
the low authentic design cues (LA) condition (HA: M = 1.70 (70% of HA emails rated 
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‘ignore’, 30% of HA emails rated ‘respond’), SE = .024, CI = 1.66, 1.75; LA: M = 
1.93 (93% of LA emails rated ‘ignore’, 7% of LA emails rated ‘respond’), SE = .010, 
CI = 1.91, 1.95), supporting hypothesis 2c. 
3.3. H3: The Impact of Salient Current Event Reference on Email Judgements 
H3a: There was no significant effect of reference to salient current events on 
ratings of email trustworthiness F(1, 176) = 1.17, p = .280, η2 < .001, therefore 
hypothesis 3a, that reference to salient current events would increase trust, was not 
supported. There was no significant interaction between salient current event 
reference and authentic design cues, F(1, 176) = 3.38, p = .068, η2 = .002.  
H3b: No significant effect of current event reference on ratings of email 
persuasiveness was shown F(1, 176) = .013, p = .909, η2 < .001, so hypothesis 3b was 
also rejected. Again, there was no significant interaction between current event 
reference and authentic design cues, F(1, 176) = 1.93, p = .17, η2 = .001.  
H3c: Finally, no significant effect of salient current event reference was 
shown for response choice, F(1, 176) = 2.79, p = .097, η2 = .002, so hypothesis 3c 
was also rejected. There was no interaction between salient current event reference 
and authentic design cues, F(1, 176) = .31, p = .579, η2 < .001.  
3.4. H4: The Impact of Online Risk Information on Email Judgements 
No significant effect of group on either ratings of trust of emails (Risk information 
group M = 4.06, control group M = 3.93; M Diff = .130, p =.130, SE = .086, CI = -
.039, .300) or ratings of persuasiveness (Risk information group M = 3.92, control 
group M = 3.82; M Diff = .09, p =.32, SE = .09, CI = -.091, .278) were found. 
Analysis of participant responses to two further self-report questions using 
independent-samples t-tests also showed that the groups did not differ on either of our 
two generic questions, namely ‘To what extent do you trust email communications in 
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general?’ (Risk information group M = 3.29, SD = 1.57, control group M = 3.64, SD = 
1.54; t(176) = 1.48, p = .14) and ‘How would you rate your awareness of the common 
techniques used in scams? (Risk information group M = 4.75, SD = 1.77, control 
group M = 5.19, SD = 1.52; t(176) = 1.78, p = .08). Therefore, hypothesis 4 was not 
supported. 
Finally, to ensure that there was no difference across the two groups according 
to degree of familiarity with the four organisations used in the emails, which may 
have confounded any between group effects, a one-way ANOVA was conducted. This 
showed that mean ratings of familiarity for each of the four organisations within the 
emails did not differ across the two groups, all F’s(1, 176) < 2.42, all p’s  > .12.  
3.5. H5: The Relationship between Habitual Email Use and Trust 
Responses on the Self-Report Habit Index ranged from 12.00 - 84.00 (M = 42.75, SD 
= 16.88). Self-reported habitual email use was found to be significantly related to an 
increased likelihood of choosing to respond to emails containing high authentic 
design cues across the various conditions (reference to Rio Olympics, r = .163, p = 
.030; no reference to Rio Olympics, r = .171, p = .023; loss-based, r = .212, p = .005) 
and low authentic design cue emails for two out of the three conditions (reference to 
Rio Olympics, r = .169, p = .024; no reference to Rio Olympics, r = .002, p = .981; 
loss-based, r = .175, p = .020). However, there was no significant relationship 
between habitual email use and ratings of email trust (all r’s < .13, p’s > .1), so 
hypothesis 5 was not supported. 
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3.6. What Factors did Participants Report as Influencing their Decision?  
Table 3 presents a count of the most common categories identified within each of the 
three themes (i.e., influence techniques, authentic design cues, and habits and 
routines). This occurrence counting approach is comparable to the approach used by 
Williams et al. (2017) and not only aids in the identification of the key factors that 
participants consider to influence their decision, but also allows us to consider 
whether the predominant factors highlighted in self-reported data correspond to the 
actual results of the quantitative judgement data. The specific findings related to each 
theme are presented below. The response of one participant could reference multiple 
categories or themes.  
Table 3. Three most common categories identified within each qualitative theme. 
Themes 
Influence Techniques Authentic Design Cues Habits and Routines 
 
Suspicious 
of reward  
27 times Email 
address  
 
59 times Use 
alternative 
verification  
9 times 
Suspicious 
of personal 
information 
requests  
21 times Logo  51 times Respond to 
only 
expected / 
usual emails  
8 times 
Professed 
organisation  
14 times Copyright 
statement  
21 times Avoid 
rewards / 
offers  
7 times 
 
3.6.1. The Role of Influence Techniques 
Eighty-nine participants referenced the presence of particular influence techniques 
within the email as influencing their decisions. These influence techniques were 
considered to either encourage them to respond (48 participants), or conversely, to 
actually make them suspicious (41 participants). For instance, although the 
opportunity to access a potential benefit or reward was highlighted thirteen times as a 
reason to respond to an email “the potential award or reimbursement for time”, this 
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was also highlighted as something that raised suspicion twenty-seven times “I would 
ignore… if it said you would win something or get something for free. Most emails 
like that are scams”. In addition to the offer of a potential reward being considered 
suspicious, emails that contained a likely request for personal information within the 
professed scenario were also highlighted as less likely to be genuine twenty-one times 
“if the email asked for personal information I wouldn't trust it”. Other primary 
influence techniques that were considered by recipients to make them more likely to 
respond to an email were the reputation of the professed organisation that sent the 
email, “what company sent the email” (mentioned 14 times), and the perceived 
importance of responding to the email, “if it involved identity then I would respond” 
(mentioned 9 times).  
3.6.2. The Presence of Authentic Design Cues 
One hundred and four participants referenced authenticity cues as impacting their 
decision. These primarily related to the factors manipulated within the study, 
including the presence of a logo “I feel like I'm more of a visual person, so whenever 
I see the symbol or something that indicates the email is trustworthy I answer it” (51 
times), the email address “the determining factor (in trustworthiness) is the email 
address of the sender” (59 times), and the presence of a copyright statement “I think 
that the copyright at the end of the email […] made a difference in the way I would 
reply to the email” (21 times). However, a number of responses also related to 
additional factors, such as the general layout of the email “the format of the email” 
(14 times), the wording used “how the email was worded” (11 times), and whether 
the email ‘seemed legitimate’ “there is a ‘look’ to them, and when there is not 
something is off” (8 times). 
3.6.3. Individual Habits and Routine Behaviour 
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Thirty-three participants also discussed how they usually handled particular types of 
emails, reflecting aspects of their routine behaviour, habits and norms. For instance, 
always avoiding emails that offered some form of reward or offer “I don't respond to 
emails that tell me to fill out a survey for a chance to win something. Usually because 
I never will win it anyway and also because it’s a ploy to get your info out” (7 times), 
those that included survey links “I am the type of person that does not take online 
surveys that come through my email” (5 times), or those that requested personal 
information “I would hesitate to respond to anything asking for updated information, 
or personal information in general” (6 times). This also included participants who 
purported always using alternative verification strategies when such emails were 
received “I typically would see stuff like that and not click the link directly but rather 
go to the site itself to see if I could find it if I questioned its validity” (9 times), and 
only ever responding to certain types of emails that were expected or usual “I do not 
generally respond to any emails that do not pertain directly to school or work” (8 
times). 
4. Discussion 
The current study examined the potential factors that influence how individuals 
evaluate suspicious emails, in particular the extent to which they trust such emails, 
how persuasive they find them, and whether they would choose to respond to them. 
Specifically, a range of factors were examined that have previously been highlighted 
in theoretical models of phishing susceptibility (Vishwanath et al., 2011; Vishwanath 
et al., 2016), focusing on (a) aspects of the message itself, including whether it used 
loss or reward-based influence techniques, whether it contained particular authentic 
design cues, and whether it referenced a salient current event (the Rio Olympics), and 
(b) aspects outside of the message, in particular whether participants had been 
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exposed to prior news information highlighting the risks of online scams and the 
extent to which recipients engaged in habitual email use.  
4.1. Message-Specific Factors 
4.1.1. Loss and Reward-based Influence Techniques 
Within the current study, emails that used loss-based influence techniques were found 
to be considered more trustworthy and more persuasive than emails focused on 
reward-based techniques, suggesting that the concept of loss aversion, whereby 
people are more sensitive to losses than gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), may be 
applied to differential responding to phishing emails that use these techniques. People 
have also been suggested to be more willing to take a risk to avoid a potential loss 
than to achieve a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), which may result in recipients 
of suspicious emails being more likely to undertake risky actions, such as clicking on 
links, for loss-based emails.  
In this way, emails that reference a potential loss to the individual if they fail 
to respond are considered to be more important to respond to, and also, interestingly 
in our study, more trustworthy, than those that offer a potential reward for responding. 
As shown in our findings for perceived persuasiveness, people may feel that loss-
based emails are more persuasive and therefore more important to respond to and as a 
result, strive to remain consistent in their judgements by rating emails that they feel 
more pressured (and likely) to respond to as also being more trustworthy. Such 
processes can be attributed to individuals’ motivation to avoid cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1962), whereby people attempt to avoid contradictions within their 
thoughts and beliefs.  
Alternatively, findings of greater relative trust for loss-based emails could 
simply be a result of greater suspicion towards reward-based emails. This may be due 
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to increasing publicity and awareness of scams that use reward-based techniques 
(such as the so-called ‘Nigerian Prince’ scam, where large amounts of money are 
offered) resulting in greater suspicion of communications that appear to offer 
‘something for nothing’. However, this appears to contrast with the findings of 
Harrison et al. (2016), whereby the presence of threat and reward-based cues did not 
differentially impact message processing or phishing susceptibility. It is possible 
therefore that these influence techniques may impact people’s evaluations and 
perceptions more than their actual response behaviour and disentangling these 
processes would be a fruitful avenue for future research. Understanding this 
mechanism further is crucial if potential mitigations against this effect are to be 
developed, in particular whether interventions should focus on reducing public 
assumptions of trust in such emails or should instead focus their efforts on reducing 
the persuasive effect of this influence technique. 
4.1.2. Authentic Design Cues 
Overall, results showed that participants were more likely to consider phishing emails 
that included authentic design cues, such as logos and copyright statements, as more 
trustworthy and more persuasive than those that did not. This suggests that individuals 
base their evaluations of the legitimacy of emails that they receive on the presence of 
such cues, as proposed by Sillence et al. (2006) in their consideration of judgements 
of health-related websites. This may occur because emails that contain logos, 
copyright statements, and include a familiar brand name within the sender address, 
invoke particular stereotypes and expectations regarding what a ‘genuine’ email 
‘looks like’, resulting in such emails failing to invoke contextual suspicion (where 
suspicion is evoked by the stimuli itself). Without a reason to doubt the legitimacy of 
an email, participants may then simply defer to assuming that the communication is 
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likely to be genuine. This is in line with literature regarding the existence of a truth 
bias in the general population, where people default to assuming that information is 
likely to be true unless they have a reason to doubt it (Levine, 2014).  
Similarly, increased trust in emails containing authentic design cues could also 
be considered in relation to the concept of integrity-based trust. Integrity relates to 
whether one adheres to a set of acceptable principles (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 
1995), and previous research suggests that violations of integrity can substantially 
reduce perceived trustworthiness (Kim, Dirks, Cooper & Ferrin, 2006). These same 
principles may thus apply to email communications, such that authentic design cues 
represent expected and acceptable principles of legitimate communications, with 
violations related to these elements (e.g., lacking a copyright statement or a particular 
structure of sender address) leading to decreased trust in those communications. 
Alternatively, the presence of such cues may monopolise attentional resources when 
participants are considering how trustworthy the email is, in a similar way to that 
proposed by Vishwanath et al. (2011) regarding the capability of influence techniques 
to monopolise attention when people decide to respond to a phishing email. In the 
former scenario, the absence of authentic design cues may actively violate integrity 
expectations, leading to a decrease in relative trust compared to a ‘default trust’ 
baseline. In the latter, the presence of authentic design cues instead attract attention 
and lead to increased ratings of trust relative to a more suspicious evaluative baseline. 
The primary difference between these possibilities being (a) whether a default trust 
baseline is assumed and then violated, resulting in decreased trust or (b) whether the 
presence of these cues increases trust levels relative to a lower baseline level. Further 
work to understand these potential mechanisms using, for instance, eye tracking 
approaches and reaction time studies, would be beneficial. 
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Unfortunately, from a practical perspective, each of these design elements are 
currently used within phishing emails to persuade people to respond. As a result, it is 
vital that effective means of assisting individuals to circumvent potentially automatic 
responses and assumptions related to such stimuli are developed. This presents a 
substantial challenge that will likely require a combination of education (Abawajay, 
2014), training (Sheng, Magnien, Kumaraguru, Acquisti, et al., 2007) and interface 
design approaches (Mohamed, Chakraborty, & Dehlinger, 2016). 
4.1.3. Referencing Salient Current Events 
A number of scam communications have emerged that reference current events, 
however to our knowledge, no research has examined whether linking phishing 
emails to events that individuals are familiar with influences trust in, or 
persuasiveness of, those emails. This is despite previous research suggesting that 
previously encountered information is more likely to be considered genuine (Begg et 
al., 1992). Within the current study, we primed participants with a current event (the 
2016 Rio Olympics) and referenced this event within a subset of emails to see 
whether referencing salient current events increased the perceived trustworthiness and 
persuasiveness of emails. However, no significant effect of trust, persuasiveness or 
response likelihood was found, suggesting that prior exposure to information 
regarding current events does not make phishing emails that link to such events 
appear any more legitimate than those that do not.  
It is possible that this lack of effect was due to a general suspicion of all 
reward-based emails, with the presence of such influence techniques effectively 
overriding any potential effect of salient current event reference. Indeed, participants 
rated reward-based emails as less trustworthy overall than those using loss-based 
influence techniques. Alternatively, participants may not have been sufficiently 
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interested in the offers provided across any of the reward-based emails, leading to a 
masking of potential effects related to current event reference. This may account for 
the lower ratings of persuasiveness of reward-based emails more generally. However, 
this explanation does not account for lower ratings of trustworthiness in such emails. 
In order to ensure that the number of emails participants evaluated was not too high, 
we did not include any reference to salient current events within the loss-based 
emails. However, to investigate the likely mechanisms related to our findings further, 
particularly whether any current event reference effects may have been masked by the 
use of reward-based influence techniques, it would be useful for future research to 
explore the impact of salient current event references on judgements of loss-based 
emails (e.g., using loss-based emails that reference recent high-profile data breaches 
in relation to account suspensions etc.). 
Finally, it is possible that the current event reference lost its salience over the 
course of the email judgement task. However, since the task used was relatively short 
(approximately 15-20 minutes duration) and individuals are unlikely to receive a 
phishing email at precisely the same time, or within a few minutes, of being exposed 
to relevant current event information, if this was the case then this would suggest that 
referencing current events would not realistically impact susceptibility within real 
world contexts.  
4.2. External Factors 
4.2.1. Exposure to Generic Risk Information  
The impact of exposure to media information regarding the risks of online scams was 
also examined within the current study. It was hypothesised that individuals who were 
exposed to generic information that highlighted the risks of online communications 
would show decreased ratings of trust and persuasiveness due to heightened 
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perceptions of the phishing risk and increased generalised suspicion. However, 
exposure to such information did not significantly impact either trust ratings or 
persuasiveness. This suggests that exposure to media reports or other information that 
aims to raise general awareness of online threats may not be sufficient to impact 
resultant susceptibility.  
Indeed, we purposefully did not include any particular information regarding 
what makes emails suspicious, or particular cues to look out for, as has been the case 
in previous education intervention approaches (e.g., Abawajay, 2014). This allowed 
us to investigate whether generic information that related to potential online risks, but 
did not include any specific advice, would be sufficient to make people more 
suspicious of communications that contained suspicious elements. Since individuals 
are increasingly bombarded with protective information relevant to all aspects of their 
lives, further work that systematically manipulates the amount and type of 
intervention information that people are exposed to would be beneficial. Within this 
study, the intervention manipulation used was not sufficient to influence judgements 
and inclusion of additional information or advice may be necessary to show any form 
of effect. Further manipulation of the depth and type of information presented in the 
future would allow greater understanding of how much information is sufficient, and 
how this information is best presented, to maximise the likelihood that people will 
identify fraudulent communications.  
4.2.2. Email Habits 
In addition to manipulating specific aspects of the phishing email that is viewed, this 
study also explored the impact of factors related to the individual who views the 
message. Overall, habitual email use was significantly related to an increased 
likelihood of choosing to respond to emails than to ignore them. This supports 
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previous findings by Vishwanath (2015) that email habits can increase participant 
susceptibility to a simulated phishing attack. However, this study also extends these 
findings by demonstrating that (a) this relationship occurs across different types of 
phishing emails, and (b) the increased likelihood of response does not correspond to 
increased ratings of trust in such emails. Therefore, although people who engage in 
habitual email use appear to be more likely to choose to respond to phishing emails, 
they do not consider these emails to be any more trustworthy than individuals who do 
not engage in habitual email use. This suggests that the increased likelihood of 
responding to emails in such individuals is due to automatic response processes rather 
than biased trust assessments arising from habitual email use. 
4.3. Limitations  
There are a number of limitations within the current study that may limit the 
conclusions that can be made from the data. Firstly, the participant sample consisted 
of university students within a relatively small age range. This does not represent the 
full range of email users and it is possible that individuals with other demographic 
characteristics may evaluate our message-specific factors in different ways. For 
instance, younger adults (18-25 years) have been identified as more susceptible to 
phishing websites than older adults. However, this effect is considered to be 
moderated by educational background, with greater education reducing susceptibility 
(Gavett, Zhao, John, Bussell, et al, 2017; Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, et 
al, 2010). Although the reasons for this are uncertain, factors associated with greater 
critical thinking skills and learning and cognition have been highlighted.  Therefore, it 
is possible that other population samples will be more, or differentially, susceptible to 
the influence techniques used within the current study. Further work exploring the 
extent to which email judgements are similar, or indeed differ, across different age 
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ranges and educational backgrounds, as well as other demographic characteristics, 
would therefore be beneficial. 
Secondly, in order to compare a number of email elements, it was necessary 
for participants to view, and make judgements of, a number of emails. This prevented 
the use of a phishing simulation approach, since it would not have been practical to 
send 20 phishing emails to each participant. As a result, actual response behaviour 
could not be measured across the different email types, instead participant self-report 
perceptions were relied upon. However, this did allow for the collection (and 
therefore separation) of data related to both degree of trust and persuasiveness and 
likelihood of response, which enabled a separate consideration of these potential 
mechanisms. After all, increased trust in an email does not necessarily mean that 
recipients will be persuaded to respond. Similarly, participants may be motivated to 
respond to a particular email despite potential misgivings about its authenticity. 
It is also possible that asking participants the extent to which they trusted each 
email may have itself invoked a degree of suspicion regarding potential message 
legitimacy. It should, therefore, be considered that this could have reduced the impact 
of the online risks news story aspect of this study, due to suspicion already being 
invoked in both groups. Further work could examine this possibility. However, if this 
is the case, then it would suggest that general awareness material does not impact 
response behaviour to any greater degree than simply requiring people to indicate the 
degree to which they think a message is trustworthy at the time that the message is 
processed. If so, this could itself represent a future mitigation strategy.  
Finally, the email stimuli that were used within the current study did not allow 
participants to interact with the email in any way (i.e., they were unable to hover over 
the link to verify the URL that it led to). However, this approach did enable us to 
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explore how the other factors under study influenced participant perceptions, 
providing the foundation for further work to build upon these aspects and identify the 
potential contributions of more interactive strategies and email elements in the future. 
5. Conclusions 
Recent advances in phishing susceptibility research have expanded current 
understanding of how people make decisions regarding suspicious emails. However, 
the precise role of various message-specific factors, including how and why they 
influence people’s judgements and decisions, remains unclear. The current study 
investigated how three of these factors, which have not been extensively examined in 
previous research, influence judgements of email trust and persuasiveness, 
specifically the use of loss and reward-based influence techniques, authentic design 
cues, and referencing a salient current event. The use of loss-based influence 
techniques and the presence of authentic design cues was found to increase perceived 
trust and persuasiveness, with a number of psychological mechanisms identified that 
may account for these findings. It is hoped that these findings will provide a basis 
from which to systematically explore the potential role of these various underlying 
mechanisms in the future. Only by understanding how people evaluate email 
communications more generally will it be possible to understand precisely why 
phishing emails work and how best to mitigate them.  
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Appendix A.  News stories provided to participants in risk information group and 
control group prior to email judgement task. 
Rio Olympics 2016: Spectacular closing ceremony (both groups) 
  
The spectacular ending of this summer’s Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro featured a 
colorful carnival parade and ceremony lasting almost 3 hours. The 16-day games, 
which showcased over 11,000 athletes, were officially closed by the chief of the 
International Olympic Committee, Thomas Bach. The closing ceremony on Aug. 21. 
was watched by billions of people around the world and included a dramatic 
extinguishing of the Olympic flame.  
 
 
The rise in online scams (risk information group only) 
 
A number of public-safety forums have been established to warn residents of the 
dangers of scams in the digital age. Criminals are making use of advancements in 
technology to make scams increasingly targeted and convincing. Anyone can fall 
victim to a scam, young or old. Across the world the problem of fake websites, emails 
and fraudulent phone calls is on the rise, so people need to increasingly be on their 
guard in this technological era. 
 
 
The challenge of sedentary lifestyles (control group only)  
 
Sitting down all day is not good for you. The rise in desk jobs and inactivity means 
that many of us have a sedentary lifestyle. Research has shown that the long periods 
of physical inactivity associated with a sedentary lifestyle are bad for our health. 
Reducing this risk remains a challenge across the globe, but one thing is for sure, we 
should all be trying to keep ourselves moving -so stand up, move more and ‘watch’ 
less. 
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Appendix B.  Example stimuli for each of the email conditions. 
a) High authenticity email related to Rio Olympics. 
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b) High authenticity email unrelated to Rio Olympics. 
 
c) Low authenticity email related to Rio Olympics. 
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d) Low authenticity email unrelated to Rio Olympics. 
 
e) High authenticity loss email. 
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f) Low authenticity loss email. 
 
